Ethical language investigates the semantics, pragmatics, and logical structure of moral discourse. It is concerned with what we mean when we use moral language and how this use relates to moral thinking and reasoning.
Significance of Ethical Language
Ethical language is not simply a matter of semantics but one that intersects with psychology, sociology, and philosophy. It informs how individuals conceive of moral issues and engage in ethical debates.
- The terms we use in moral conversations carry weight and shape our ethical outlook.
- "Right" and "wrong" serve as guiding principles for actions and moral judgments.
- Ethical language contributes to forming societal norms and legal frameworks.
The Meaning of "Right" and "Wrong"
- These terms are foundational in ethical discussions, yet their meanings can be elusive and contested.
- "Right" often implies conformity with moral law, social norms, or personal principles, while "wrong" denotes a departure from these standards.
- The challenge is how to define these terms without circularity and in a way that holds universal appeal.
Cognitivism vs Non-Cognitivism
This debate interrogates whether moral claims are capable of being true or false (cognitive content) or whether they are expressions of emotional states or imperatives without truth value.
Cognitivism
- Cognitivists assert that ethical statements are truth-apt, which means they can be true or false.
- They often engage with moral realism, which posits that there are moral facts about which one can be correct or incorrect.
- Philosophers such as G.E. Moore and R.M. Hare have contributed significantly to this perspective.
Non-Cognitivism
- Non-cognitivists view moral language as non-propositional, denying that moral claims are subject to truth or falsity.
- They argue that moral language is persuasive, meant to influence behaviour or express approval or disapproval.
- A.J. Ayer and Simon Blackburn are notable proponents of this view, offering perspectives such as emotivism and quasi-realism, respectively.
Naturalism vs Non-Naturalism
This discourse revolves around the nature of moral properties—whether they are observable and natural or non-empirical and sui generis.
Naturalism
- Ethical Naturalists claim that moral truths are grounded in natural properties like happiness or health, which are empirically observable.
- They advocate for a reductionist view, where moral terms are reducible to non-moral, natural terms.
- Proponents like John Stuart Mill have linked happiness with the good, suggesting an empirical approach to ethics.
Non-Naturalism
- Non-Naturalists reject the notion that moral qualities are natural by arguing they are conceptually distinct from natural phenomena.
- Philosophers such as G.E. Moore argue through his "open question argument" that moral properties are indefinable and not reducible to natural properties.
- Non-naturalism underscores the independence of moral values from empirical science.
Intuitionism
Intuitionism posits that moral truths are known through direct intellectual intuition or understanding.
- This perspective asserts that certain moral truths are self-evident, requiring no further justification.
- Intuitionism gained prominence with philosophers like Henry Sidgwick and Moore, who maintained that basic moral propositions are known a priori.
- It faces challenges in accounting for widespread moral disagreement and the subjectivity of moral intuitions.
Emotivism
Emotivism stands as a potent expression of non-cognitivism, emphasising the emotive function of moral language.
- Developed by philosophers such as Ayer and Charles L. Stevenson, emotivism posits that moral statements are expressions of emotional reactions and are persuasive in nature.
- It characterises moral discourse as a means to influence others' actions rather than to state truths.
- Emotivism has been critiqued for not accounting for the complexity of moral language, which often goes beyond mere expressions of feeling.
Challenges in Interpreting Ethical Language
- Relativism: If moral language is interpreted relative to cultural or individual frameworks, it leads to questions about the objectivity and universality of moral claims.
- Disagreement: Persistent disagreements in moral language use complicate the search for consensus in ethical discourse.
- Definition: Crafting a precise and universally acceptable definition of ethical terms is an ongoing philosophical challenge.
Application in Normative Theories
Each normative theory presumes certain things about the nature of ethical language, informing their structure and application.
- In Utilitarianism, ethical language tends to be naturalistic, as the theory evaluates the morality of actions based on outcomes that can, in principle, be measured.
- Kantian deontology often aligns with a cognitivist approach, where the language of duty and rights presupposes that certain moral statements can be true or false.
Impact of Ethical Language on Moral Discourse
The way ethical language is interpreted and used has a profound effect on both personal moral decision-making and broader societal norms.
- Ethical language shapes laws, public policies, and international treaties.
- The development of a shared ethical vocabulary is key to resolving conflicts and advancing human rights and justice.
FAQ
If moral scepticism — the view that no moral beliefs are justified — is true, it presents a complex challenge for the meaning of ethical language. Moral scepticism could imply that although ethical language attempts to convey ideas about what is morally right or wrong, these ideas have no objective basis. However, even if scepticism is true, ethical language can still have meaning as it plays a role in influencing behaviour and expressing societal norms. It might be that the 'meaning' of ethical language, in this case, is not in its truth value but in its usage within human practices and its role in expressing and shaping our emotions, actions, and social interactions.
The emotive theory of ethics is a branch of non-cognitivism that focuses on the emotional aspects of moral language. It suggests that ethical statements are not about facts but are expressions of the speaker's emotions and are designed to evoke emotions in others. According to the emotive theory, when someone says "Charity is good," they are not making a statement about an objective fact of the world; rather, they are expressing a positive feeling towards charity and hoping to inspire a similar feeling in others. This theory contributes to non-cognitivism by providing a specific explanation for the nature of moral discourse, emphasising the expression and evocation of emotional responses rather than the assertion of empirical truths.
Error theory, associated with J.L. Mackie, is a meta-ethical view that, while maintaining that ethical statements are cognitive (thus they are capable of being true or false), claims that all such statements are false because they refer to intrinsic moral values that do not exist. According to error theory, when people use ethical language, they are systematically in error because they presuppose the existence of objective moral facts. For instance, saying "Stealing is wrong" assumes that there is a moral fact about the wrongness of stealing, but according to error theory, such a fact does not exist. Therefore, ethical language, while meaningful and structured to convey propositions, is fundamentally flawed because it fails to correspond to any objective moral reality.
Prescriptivism in ethical language, advocated by philosophers like R.M. Hare, suggests that moral statements not only express feelings but also function imperatively, prescribing actions. Unlike emotivism, which argues that moral language merely expresses emotions, prescriptivism maintains that ethical statements are universalisable prescriptions that guide behaviour. For instance, when someone says "Lying is wrong," according to prescriptivism, they're not just expressing disapproval of lying but also instructing against it and implying that if lying is wrong in one case, it is wrong in all similar cases. This approach recognises the action-guiding nature of moral language and attempts to provide a rational basis for ethical discussions and decisions, considering the consequences and consistency of our moral prescriptions.
The Frege-Geach problem poses a significant challenge to non-cognitivism by questioning how moral language can be coherent in complex sentences if it doesn’t express beliefs or propositions. Non-cognitivists argue that moral language merely expresses attitudes, not truths. However, when moral statements are embedded in conditional clauses or arguments, they seem to retain their meaning without directly expressing an attitude. For example, if one says, "If stealing is wrong, then encouraging stealing is wrong," the problem arises in explaining the moral terms' consistency without attributing to them a propositional quality. This indicates that moral language has a logical structure that non-cognitivism struggles to account for, suggesting that ethical expressions might indeed have truth-value or cognitive content.
Practice Questions
Emotivism posits that moral statements reflect emotional reactions and are not about facts or assertions that can be true or false. An adept IB Philosophy student would acknowledge that, according to emotivism, when we make moral claims like "Stealing is wrong," we are not stating a truth but expressing disapproval. They would critically evaluate this by considering its implications, such as the inability of emotivism to account for moral reasoning or disagreements that seem to be about matters of fact. Furthermore, they might question the capacity of emotivism to provide a robust foundation for moral discourse, which often involves asserting and debating truth claims.
Ethical naturalism contends that moral properties are identical to, or at least supervene on, natural properties. Drawing on the work of a philosopher like John Stuart Mill, an exemplary IB Philosophy student would explain how ethical naturalism grounds moral language in natural phenomena such as pleasure or happiness. They might discuss how this approach implies that moral language can be subject to empirical investigation, potentially offering a more objective basis for ethical discussion. However, they would also critically examine challenges to naturalism, such as the is-ought gap highlighted by David Hume, which questions the leap from descriptive natural states to prescriptive moral judgments.
